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between a criminal defendant and the defending attorney is invalid, as it is contrary to public 
policy. This decision also adopted the theory of pure prospective overruling. This decision is a 
clear manifestation of judicial activism in interpretation. Generally, courts take the following 
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I. Introduction
On July 23, 2015, The Korean Supreme Court rendered an important en 
banc decision about contingent fee agreements in criminal cases.1) The 
Supreme Court declared that any contingent fee agreement between a 
criminal defendant and the defending attorney is invalid, as it is contrary to 
public policy.2) This decision aroused great controversy. The Korean Bar 
Association (KBA) vehemently criticized it and raised a constitutional 
complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) against this decision with the 
Constitutional Court.3) It must be noted that the Supreme Court overruled 
an earlier decision that recognized the enforceability of contingent fee 
agreements in criminal cases, but at the same time decided that the new 
rule of invalidity created by the decision should be applied only in the 
future. In other words, the Supreme Court adopted and applied the theory 
of pure prospective overruling to this case.
In my opinion, this decision is a clear manifestation of judicial activism. 
The Court established a new rule regarding a problem of great social 
importance by resorting to a general clause without an explicit statutory 
mandate. Furthermore, the theory of prospective overruling, which the 
Supreme Court adopted in this decision, is a clear indicator of judicial 
activism. The prospective application of the new rule makes it easier to 
overrule, as overruling does not cause any shocks to the settled relations of 
the parties.4) This paper analyzes this decision from the perspective of 
1) Supreme Court, 2015Da200111, (Gong2015Ha, 1238), Jul. 23, 2015. The English 
translation of the decision can be found at the homepage of the Supreme Court Library 
(https://library.scourt.go.kr/kor/judgment/eng_judg.jsp).
2) MINBUP [The Korean Civ. Code] art. 103 (S. KOR.): A juristic act which has for its 
object such matters as contrary to good morals and other social order shall be null and void. 
This article corresponds to Article 138 subpara. 1 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, BGB).
3) See http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150728000996 (last visit: May 27, 
2016). However, the Constitutional Court Act does not permit raising the Constitutional 
Complaint against decisions of courts.
4) According to Justice Scalia of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court, prospective decision 
making is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis. Harper v. 
Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, Concurring).
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judicial activism. In Part II, I describe the decision and the academic 
response to it. Part III elaborates on the concept of judicial activism in 
interpretation. In part IV,I try to determine the factors relevant to judicial 
activism, while Part V deals with prospective overruling.
II. The Decision 
1. The Situation Before the Decision
Until this decision, there was little debate about the validity of contingent 
fee agreements. The precedents acknowledged the validity of such 
agreements without explicit explanation in both civil and in criminal cases.5) 
Occasionally, a court reduced the amount of the contingent fee when it 
found the agreed-upon fee to be excessive.6)
However, some doubt was raised on the enforceability of contingent fee 
agreements. One commentator asserted that contingent fee agreements in 
all cases, both civil and criminal, should be banned altogether, as they are 
contrary to public policy. He opined that permitting contingent fees may 
make attorneys defend only the interests of their clients and ignore any 
broader concerns of social justice. In order to preserve the independence 
and impartiality of attorneys, contingent fee agreements should thus be 
prohibited.7)
Other writers asserted that the contingent fee in criminal cases should 
not be allowed. According to them, a contingent fee agreement in itself can 
be beneficial to a party that cannot afford the attorney’s fee and can give the 
attorney the incentive to give her best effort. However, in criminal cases, 
the contingent fee agreement, on the condition that the arrested defendant 
is released, for example, should be deemed as contradicting public policy. 
5) Civil Cases: Supreme Court 91Da7989, (Gong1992.1.1.(911), 85), Nov. 12, 1991 and 
more. Criminal Case: Supreme Court 2009Da21249, Jul. 9, 2009 (unpublished). The latter was 
overruled by this decision.
6) Supreme Court, 91Da29804, (Gong1992.5.15.(920), 1404), Mar. 31, 1992,  and more.
7) Kwon, Oseung, Byeonhosaeui Seonggongbosu [Contingency Fee of Lawyer], Minsa 
Pallyeyeongu [Journal of Private Case Law Studies], Vol. 16, pp. 167-175 (1994).
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There is a concern that attorneys would be inclined to use inappropriate 
means to ensure that they obtained the contingent fee. Moreover, it could 
lead to public distrust of the criminal justice system.8)
2. Underlying Facts of the Decision
The plaintiff’s father was detained on charges of theft. The plaintiff 
retained the defendant, an attorney-at-law, as the counsel for the defense of 
the plaintiff’s father and paid the initial attorney’s fee of 10 million Korean 
won (KRW), with an additional agreement to pay an additional amount 
upon the release of plaintiff’s father. After the defendant’s petition for but 
before the grant of the plaintiff’s father’s release on bail, the plaintiff paid 
the defendant an additional KRW 100 million. In the first instance trial, the 
plaintiff’s father was sentenced to three years imprisonment with five years 
of probation. At the appellate trial, after some charges were withdrawn, the 
plaintiff’s father was subject to the same sentence, which then became final. 
The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the defendant demanding the return 
of the KRW 100 million on the following grounds: (a) The KRW 100 million 
was paid to be spent for solicitation of the assigned judge and, as such, the 
wrongfulness of the defendant as the beneficiary far outweighs that of the 
plaintiff; and (b) even if the payment were made as a contingent fee, it was 
null and void for being excessive to the point of contradicting the principle 
of good faith.
The appellate court found that the payment of KRW 100 million by the 
plaintiff was based on the contingency fee agreement. However, the 
appellate court ordered the defendant to return KRW 40 million to the 
plaintiff, as the portion in excess of KRW 60 million was excessive, against 
the principles of good faith and equity, and thus invalid.
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. 
3. The Decision 
The Supreme Court unanimously confirmed the decision of the 
8) For example, Jinsu Yune, JuseokminbubChongchik [Commentary on the Civil Code, 
General Part], Bd. 2, 3.ed., 2001, pp. 445 f.; 4. ed., 2010, p. 425. 
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appellate court. It declared contingent fee agreements in criminal cases to 
be invalid; however, this rule of invalidity should be applied only 
prospectively, that is, to contingent fee agreements entered into after the 
date of the decision. The reasoning of the Court can be summarized as 
follows.
The involvement of a contingent fee may lead the attorney to share 
interests entirely with the client, rather than merely offering high-quality 
legal service and as a result may endanger the independence and public 
nature of the attorney’s professional duties, which in turn may hinder the 
adequate realization of the State’s criminal punitive authority. As such, 
there is a risk that an attorney may be tempted to exercise influence directly 
or indirectly on those in charge of investigation or trial in order to secure a 
successful outcome that would trigger payment of contingent fees. Thus, it 
is not inconceivable that even the client would have false expectations 
regarding the ability to affect the disposition of a case by agreeing to 
contingent fees, even if that meant that the attorney might have to resort to 
inappropriate means. For that reason, there is the risk that the integrity of 
public officials in charge of the criminal justice system may be held in 
suspicion or, worse, that even the most justifiable and reasonable 
investigation and trial outcome may be misperceived as a distorted result of 
undue influence, which would undermine confidence in the criminal justice 
system as a whole. With the accumulation of client distrust and complaints 
about contingent fee arrangements, a negative perception of attorneys as 
“those who easily profit by means of physical arrest or criminal punishment” 
might become prevalent in society. This would threaten the justification for 
the bar itself, which would be a major hurdle to gaining trust in and 
submission to criminal trials.
In civil cases, an outcome can be classified as a win or a loss. Therefore, 
allowing a contingent fee agreement is not problematic. If the client prevails 
and recovers, then s/he may gain an economic interest out of which to pay 
the attorney’s fees. Thus, because even those clients who would not 
ordinarily have sufficient means to pay the attorney may have access to 
assistance of counsel on the condition of paying a contingent fee, a 
contingent fee agreement can be justified. By contrast, in criminal cases, by 
no means can the client make economic gains depending on the outcome of 
the trial that may then be shared with the attorney. Moreover, the court 
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must appoint a public defender when the defendant is unable to retain a 
defense counsel for reasons of indigence or for any other reason. Therefore, 
we cannot simply equate a contingent fee agreement in a criminal case with 
a similar arrangement in a civil case.
Taking into account the various social evils and adverse effects 
engendered by a contingent fee agreement in criminal cases, the contingent 
fee agreement in a criminal case relates the outcome of investigation and 
trial to a pecuniary payment, and thereby imposes a risk of undermining 
the public nature of the attorney’s profession, the mission of which is to 
advocate for fundamental human rights and to realize social justice; it also 
significantly weakens clients’ and the general public’s confidence in the 
judicial system and may thus be evaluated as contrary to good morals and 
social order.
In sum, the main reason Supreme Court provided for invalidating the 
contingent fee agreement in criminal cases was the adverse effect of that 
sort of agreement: namely, that it may generate distrust in the judicial 
system. The supplementing opinion of four justices stressed that more than 
a few members of the public still believe that the phenomenon of 
“acquitting the rich and convicting the poor” persists in the criminal justice 
system and that it cannot be denied that contingent fee arrangements in 
criminal cases have thus far played the negative role of aggravating the 
misunderstanding and distrust of the fairness and integrity of the criminal 
justice system.
However, the Court ordered the prospective application of the rule, as it 
feared the retroactive application would endanger legal certainty. Its 
reasoning is laid out in what follows. 
The question of which juristic act goes against good morals and other 
social order and thus is void under Article 103 of the Civil Code should be 
determined at the time of the juristic act. Meanwhile, the attitude of the 
Supreme Court precedent thus far was that contingent fee agreements were 
valid in principle, irrespective of any distinction between the types of cases 
accepted or their features. It is true that attorneys and clients failed to grasp 
fully the problems attendant on contingent fees in criminal cases and/or 
the influence such problems may exert on the validity of contingent fee 
agreements. Consequently, it was not uncommon to draw up even normal 
fees that were designed to be paid by the client in the manner of contingent 
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fees. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude those fee arrangements already 
entered into as void merely for the reason that the fee agreement was 
nominally a contingent fee agreement. However, if ever a contingent fee 
agreement is entered into in the future, because the Supreme Court has 
made it clear through this decision that contingent fee agreements in 
criminal cases may be evaluated as contrary to good morals and other 
social order, then such an agreement should be deemed void.
4. The Influence of Foreign Laws
It is apparent that this decision was influenced by foreign laws. The 
supplementing opinion listed the legal systems of the U.S., U.K., Germany, 
and France as among those that have long prohibited contingent fee 
arrangements in criminal cases as against the public interest, grounded in 
concerns over infringement on the independence and public nature of the 
attorneys’ professional duties or disrupting judicial justice. The press 
release issued by the press officer of the Supreme Court on the day after the 
decision explained the legal situation of other countries and The Code of 
Conduct for European Lawyers on this matter in detail.9)
Germany precedents have regarded contingent fee agreements 
(Erfolgshonorarvereinabrung) as contrary to public policy and invalid since 
1926.10) The decision of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) on 
December 15, 1960, reaffirmed those precedents.11) According to that 
decision, an attorney has the duty to maintain independence vis-a-vis the 
client. This independence is at risk if an attorney’s own interests lie in the 
outcome of the dispute, as, in such a case, an attorney could be induced to 
strive for success without consideration for the real factual and legal 
situation, perhaps even resorting to dishonest means.
The Federal Attorney Act (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung) of 1994 
9) http://www.scourt.go.kr/portal/news/NewsViewAction.work?currentPage= 
&searchWord=성공보수&searchOption=&seqnum=1055&gubun=6 (last visit: June 3, 2016). 
However, it is not entirely accurate that France prohibits contingent fee agreement altogether. 
French law does not prohibit contingent fee agreement, only pactum de quota litis is not 
allowed. See Article 10 of Loi n° 71-1130 du 31 décembre 1971.
10) See, Jan Schepke, Das Erfolgshonorar des Rechtsanwalts, 1998. 
11) NJW 1961, 313.
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comprehensively prohibited contingent fee agreements. However, in 2006, 
the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declared that the 
prohibition of contingent fees is incompatible with the Constitution to the 
extent that it allows no exception for cases in which, through a success-
based fee agreement, the attorney takes account of special circumstances of 
a client that prevent that client from pursuing her or his rights.12) As a result 
of this decision, the law was changed; the revised Attorney’s Compensation 
Act (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz) Article 4a postulates that the 
contingent fee may be agreed upon only when clients would, thanks to 
such an agreement, be able to pursue their rights because of their economic 
circumstances.
In England and Wales, after a long period of the prohibition of 
contingent fee agreements,13) a conditional fee agreement, including a 
success fee agreement, was legally acknowledged by section 58 of the 
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.14) However, conditional fee agreements 
for criminal and family proceedings are still not permitted.15) At present, 
only conditional fee agreements for personal injury proceedings are 
permitted.16)
In the US, contingent fee agreements were considered unethical and 
illegal in the 19thcentury in both civil and in criminal cases. While civil 
contingent fees have gradually become accepted in that country, the 
treatment of the contingent fees in criminal cases has not changed.17) The 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2004) 
provides that a lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or 
collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.18) It 
12) BVerfGE 117, 163.
13) See Schepke, supra note 10, pp. 21 ff.
14) A conditional fee agreement means an agreement which provides for that person’s 
fees and expenses, or any part of them, to be payable only in specified circumstances. Section 
58 (2) of the original act. It can include succession fee. See section 58 (2) (b) of the present Act 
revised in 1999.
15) Section 58 (10) of the original Act; Section 58 A (1) of the present Act.
16) Article 4 of the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013.
17) Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 593 ff. (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 Colum. L. 
Rev. 597 ff. (1993).
18) Rule 1. 5. (d) (2). This rule was first adopted in 1969 by the Model Code of 
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can be said that the ban on formal contingent fees in criminal cases is thus 
well and broadly established.19) For the justification of this ban, several 
arguments have been advanced.20) One is that contingent fee agreements 
lead to conflicts of interest between attorney and client, while another holds 
that, while a successful plaintiff’s civil suit produces a res (“thing”) with 
which to pay the contingent fee, there is no res produced in a successful 
criminal defense. Still one more argument is that, while contingent fees may 
make legal services available to a group of litigants who would otherwise 
be unable to retain counsel, indigent criminal defendants have a 
guaranteed right to appointed counsel. The final argument asserts that 
contingent fees create a risk of overzealous and compromised 
representation. An attorney will have a greater incentive to engage in 
corrupt practices if they enhance his/her prospects of financial gain.
5. The Response to the Decision
As noted above, the KBA vehemently criticized the decision and went 
so far as to file a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court.
Appraisal by scholars was divided. One author welcomed the decision. 
She stressed that attorneys have an official duty to preserve justice and 
human rights. If people believed that the results of criminal cases might 
differ depending on defendants’ economic capacity, this would bring about 
great distrust in the judicial system. Therefore, contingent fee agreements in 
criminal cases should be prohibited. Contingent fee agreements in family 
court cases should also be allowed. However, the author was critical of the 
decision in that the Supreme Court did not authorize the retroactive 
application of the rule. The prospective application of invalidity does not 
cohere with the concept of invalidity.21)
Other authors regarded the decision as incorrect. One asserted that the 
Professional Responsibility.
19) See Karlan supra note 17, p. 602. However, there are some critical opinions. See 
Lushing supra note 17 and Karlan supra note 17.
20) See Lushing supra note 17, pp. 515 ff.; Karlan, supra note 17, p. 602 ff.
21) Yun-soon Jang, Hyeongsasageoneui Seonggongbosugeumyakjeongeui Hyoryeoke Guanhan 
Yeongu [Research on the Effects of the Contingent Fee Agreements in Criminal Cases], 
Dong-A Law Review, Vol 69, pp. 297-328(2015).
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ban on contingent fee agreements could not achieve the aim of preventing 
the emergence of distrust in the judicial system. Moreover, new attorneys 
will experience more difficulty than those with careers as judges or 
prosecutors, as the contingent fee system allows less experienced attorneys 
greater chances of being retained. In this view, contingent fee agreements 
should be regulated by the statutory attorney law or the ethics code of the 
KBA.22) Another author noted that it is difficult to justify denying the 
validity of contingent fee agreements only for criminal cases. Contingent 
fees function as a mechanism for lawyers to be paid the appropriate level of 
efforts. From the point of view of social welfare, agreements between 
defense lawyers and clients in criminal cases will become more rigid than 
before the judgement. On the other hand, whether this decision would 
reduce the demands for former judges and prosecutors now serving in 
private practice remains uncertain. As the contingent fee agreement has 
been ruled void, defense lawyers’ fees will temporarily decrease, but the 
social welfare effect is unclear, since the mechanisms that can inspire better 
efforts from lawyers no longer exist.23)
III. Judicial Activism in the Interpretation
1. The Concept of Judicial Activism
There are different definitions of judicial activism in the literature. For 
example, Canon lists six dimensions of activism: majoritarianism, 
interpretive stability, interpretive fidelity, substance/democratic process 
distinction, specificity of policy, and availability of an alternate 
22) Jewan Kim, Hyeongsasageon Byeonhosa Seonggongbosuyakjeong Muhyohwae Daehan-
Bipanjeok Gochal [Contingent Fee Agreements for Criminal Case Representations in South Korea], 
Ingweongua Jeongeui [Human Rights and Justice, Official Journal of KBA], Vol. 457, pp. 6-35 
(2016).
23) Chang Min Lee· Han Soo Choi, Hyeongsaseonggongbosu Muhyo Yakjeong Pangyule-
Daehan Beobkyeongjehakjeok Bunseok [Economic Analysis on the Supreme Court’s Judgement 
That Contingent Fee Agreements for Criminal Cases Are Void], Korean Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 165-186 (2016).
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policymaker.24) Kmiec identifies five core meanings of judicial activism: 
invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions of other branches, failure 
to adhere to precedent, judicial “legislation,” departures from accepted 
interpretive methodology, and result-oriented judging.25)
In the context of the present paper, I would like to distinguish three 
dimensions of judicial activism, namely: (1) judicial activism in judicial 
review, (2) judicial activism in interpretation, and (3) the readiness to 
overrule precedents. Judicial activism in judicial review means that courts 
are prone to invalidate acts of the legislative or executive branches. Judicial 
activism in interpretation occurs when courts interpret the law extensively 
or use analogy to arrive at their preferred results. The readiness to overrule 
precedents denotes the extent to which courts respect the principle of stare 
decisis. Much of the legal literature includes these three dimensions in the 
concept of judicial activism, although with different terminology.26)
In particular, the distinction between judicial activism in judicial review 
and judicial activism in interpretation is important in countries like Korea 
or Germany, where Constitutional Courts have exclusive competency to 
invalidate a statute enacted by the legislature. In countries under this type 
of rule, ordinary courts other than Constitutional Courts cannot engage in 
judicial review of laws passed by a legislature. However, activist 
interpretation by courts has an implication for the judicial review. If courts 
extensively interpret the law so as not to collide with the constitution,27) the 
necessity for Constitutional Courts to invalidate laws is diminished.28) 
24) Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 Judicature pp. 239 
ff.(1983).
25) Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism, 92 Cal. Law 
Review, pp. 1444 ff. (2004).
26) See, Stephanie A Lindquist and Frank B Cross, Measuring Judicial Activism, 2008, pp. 
29 ff.
27) The so-called constitution-compatible interpretation (Verfassungskonforme Auslegung in 
German).
28) This relation between judicial activism in judicial review and in interpretation is well 
illustrated in the English case of Bellinger v. Bellinger (2003), 2 W. L. R. 117 (House of Lords, 
April 10, 2003). In this case, the House of Lords declined to interpret »female« in sec. 11(c) of 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to include a transsexual female, but instead declared that 
above sec. 11(c) was incompatible with the right to respect for her private life under Art. 8 and 
with her right to marry under Art.12 of the European Convention of Human Rights. If the 
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Therefore, the counter-majoritarian problem, which is inherent in judicial 
review, is not a problem in the case of judicial activism in interpretation. 
However, the common problem between these two forms of judicial 
activism is the definition of the relation between the legislature and the 
judiciary. In other words, the separation of powers principle is of great 
import in both cases. 
This section and those that follow are dedicated to judicial activism in 
interpretation. The readiness to overrule precedents is dealt with in part V 
in relation to prospective overruling.
2. Judicial Activism in Interpretation
Judicial activism in interpretation can be better understood by 
comparison with the notion of judicial restraint in interpretation. A 
restrained court declines to accept an interpretation that is not supported 
by the clear wording of a statute, even if the result of that interpretation is 
preferred by the court itself. By contrast, an activist court interprets the law 
broadly to achieve its preferred result, even though the text of the statute is 
ambiguous or non-existent with regard to the matter in question. 
Sometimes, when it is clear that the result cannot be derived from the text 
of the statute, the activist court uses analogy.29)
Several examples from German and Korean precedents are provided 
below. The first is the legal treatment of transsexuals in the two countries.30) 
A 1978 German Federal Constitutional Court decision31) declared that one 
who had undergone a transsexual operation could be treated as a man in 
House of Lords interpreted female in the Act to include a transsexual female, there were no 
need of incompatibility decision. About this decision, see Jinsu Yune, The Role of the Courts in 
the Protection of Transsexuals’ Human Rights: A Comparison of Korea with Germany and the U. K., 
in Helms und Zeppernick (Herausgeber), Lebendiges Familienrecht, Festschrift für Rainer 
Frank, 2008, pp. 415 ff.; Günter Hager, Der Einfluss des Human Rights Act 1998 auf die 
Rechtsmethode in England, ibid., pp. 27 ff.
29) Strictly speaking, one can distinguish analogy from interpretation in the original 
meaning. However, the word ‘interpretation’ is used here extensively to include analogy or 
even the creation of law by the court (richterliche Rechtsschöpfung).
30) See Jinsu Yune supra note 28. 
31) Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on September 11, 1978 (BVerfGE 
49, 286).
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the context of the Civil Status Act (Personenstandsgesetz). In this case, the 
transsexual had raised an application for his sex, which was designated in 
the birth register as male, to be changed to female. The Appellate Court of 
Berlin (Kammergericht) accepted the application by way of analogy. The 
court found that the provision of corrections of the birth register laid out in 
the Act did not cover the applicant’s case, because this provision covered 
only the cases of incorrectness that had existed when entries were first 
made, and that this gap could be filled by analogy. However, the 
German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) did not agree with the 
Appellate Court. According to it, such an analogy was not permissible. In 
contrast to these two decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court found that 
the concept of correction in the Act could be interpreted to denote an ex post 
rectification of a false statement. Therefore, a transsexual should be allowed 
to apply for the correction of her or his sex designated in the birth register. 
The Court justified this result by the way of constitution-compatible 
interpretation.
The majority opinion of the Korean Supreme Court accepted the 
reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court.32) By contrast, the 
dissenting opinion understood the majority opinion not as an interpretation 
of the Family Register Act, but rather as an analogy. It opined that this kind 
of analogy was beyond the limit established by the legislation and that the 
legislature, not the court, should decide how to solve the question of 
transsexuals. In my view, the true explanation of the German and Korean 
case law should be that each court employed analogy rather than 
interpretation. The Korean and German courts both filled the gap by 
analogy under the name of constitution-compatible interpretation. 
However, the results in each case can be supported.33) These cases are good 
examples of judicial activism in interpretation.34)
32) Supreme Court 2004Su42, Jun. 22, 2006, Pallyekongbo 2006, 1341 ff. The supplementing 
opinion to the majority opinion cited to the above decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional decision.
33) See Jinsu Yune supra note 28, pp. 418 ff.
34) Jinsu Yune, Judicial Activism and the Constitutional Reasoning of the Korean Supreme Court 
in the Field of Civil Law, in Jiunn-rong Yeh (ed.), The Functional Transformation of Courts, Taiwan 
and Korea in Comparison, pp. 123-138 (2015).
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Another example is a Korean case law regarding retrial35) in a criminal 
proceeding. Article 23 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, 
etc. of Legal Proceedings prescribes that, when it is impossible to determine 
the whereabouts of a criminal defendant in the trial proceedings at the 
court of first instance, trials may be held without hearing a statement from 
that defendant. Article 23-2 deals with the retrial of such a defendant and 
stipulates that any person who has been found guilty under a trial 
according to Article 23 and was unable to attend the trial proceedings due 
to the reasons unattributable to him or her may file a request for a retrial to 
the court of first instance.36)
In its en banc decision of June 25, 2015,37) Supreme Court offered a 
divided opinion as to whether a defendant can file a request for a retrial 
against the appellate court decision according to Article 23-2 of the Act. In 
this case, the defendant was sentenced to 5 million KRW in absentia, 
according to Article 23 of the Act, in the first trial. The prosecutor appealed 
that decision. The appellate court reversed the decision and ordered one 
year of imprisonment in the absence of the defendant. After the decision 
became final, the defendant asserted that there were grounds for retrial 
according to Article 23-2 of the Act.
The point at issue was whether a defendant may file a request for a 
retrial against the decision of the appellate court, not against the decision of 
the court of first instance, as prescribed precisely in Article 23-2. The 
majority opinion answered in the positive, arguing that Article 23-2 can be 
applied to the decision of the appellate court by analogy. It reasoned that, 
in light of constitutional provisions, especially the right of fair trial, the 
defendant may file a request for a retrial against the decision of the 
appellate court. By contrast, the dissenting opinion of two justices denied 
the possibility of analogy, asserting that the majority opinion went beyond 
the legitimate power of statutory interpretation. It felt sympathy with the 
35) Wiederaufnahme in German.
36) The former Article 23 was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court 
decision of Constitution Court 97Heonba22 (HeonGongJe29Ho), Jul. 16, 1998.   Honpop 
chaepanso Pallyejip (Reports of Constitutional Court Decisions) Vol. 10-2, 218. The reason was 
that the extent to which this Article could be applied was too broad. As a result, Article 23 
was revised to narrow the applicable extent and Article 23-2 on retrial was newly inserted.
37) Supreme Court 2014Do17252, (Gong2015Ha, 1112), Jun. 25, 2015.
 The Decision of the Korean Supreme Court on the Contingent Fee …   |  177No. 1: 2016
intention of the majority opinion to accord the defendant the right to a fair 
trial by giving him the chance of a retrial. However, there was no such 
provision in the Act, and such a defect in the Act should be dealt with in 
legislation by the Assembly, not by an interpretation of the courts. 
The majority and dissenting opinions are typical examples of judicial 
activism and judicial restraint respectively.
The third example is the recognition of a general personality right 
(Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) by German courts. As known to all German 
jurists, Article 253 subpara. 1 of the German Civil Code specifies that 
money may be demanded in compensation for any damage that is not 
pecuniary loss only in cases stipulated by the law. Nevertheless, the 
German Federal Court of Justice had awarded money in cases of non-
pecuniary loss not stipulated by the law in the name of protecting the 
general personality right.38) It was controversial whether such precedents 
went beyond the legitimate sphere of interpretation. However, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court confirmed the precedents of the Federal Court 
of Justice and expressly acknowledged the competence of the judge to 
employ creative discovery of law (schöpferischer Rechtsfindung).39) The 
Constitutional Court opined that, in certain circumstances, more of a law 
exists beyond the positive statutes of the state power, which has its source 
in the constitutional legal system and is capable of acting as a corrective 
against the written law. Finding the law and actualizing it in decisions is 
the task of the judiciary.40)
3. General Clauses as a Means of Judicial Activism
General clauses such as good faith41) and public policy42) can be 
38) BGHZ 26, 349 (Herrenreiter); BGHZ 35, 363 (Ginsengwurzel). 
39) BVerfGE 34, 269 (Soraya).
40) “Gegenüber den positive Satzungen der Staatsgewalt kann unter Umständen ein 
Mehr an Recht bestehen, das seine Quelle in der verfassungsmäßigen Rechtsordnung als 
einem Sinnganzen besitzt und dem geschriebenen Gesetz gegenüber als Korrektiv zu wirken 
vermag; es zu finden und in Entscheidungen zu verwirklichen, ist Aufgabe der 
Rechtsprechung.”
41) MINBUP [The Korean Civ. Code] art. 2, para.1. (S. KOR.)
42) MINBUP [The Korean Civ. Code] art. 103, para.1. (S. KOR.)
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convenient tools for the activist judge, as shown by this case. General 
clauses empower the courts to decide in the manner of what they regard as 
equitable,43) but they do not indicate precisely how to decide on cases. 
General clauses can be channels for general principles, such as the 
guarantee of human rights, to flow into private law.44) In this manner, 
courts can play an active role in the sense of judicial activism. Nevertheless, 
it must be stressed that general clauses are not licenses for courts to decide 
cases based on a subjective evaluation of equity. Rather, they must comply 
with the objective law.
Two examples from German case law can be cited here as general 
clauses used as tools of judicial activism. One is the so-called revaluation 
precedent (Aufwertungsrechtsprechung).45) In the period of hyperinflation 
after the First World War, the Imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht), then 
the highest court in Germany, declared on November 28, 1923 that the debt 
one owed to a creditor should be revaluated to adapt to the devaluation of 
the debt due to inflation.46) The court based its decision on the good faith 
provision of Article 242 of the German Civil Code. However, the decision 
was heavily criticized as interfering with the realm of the legislature.47)
Another example is the precedent on the invalidity of a suretyship 
contract made by the close relatives of a debtor. Typical cases develop 
when individuals becomes sureties of debts that their parents or domestic 
partners owe to banks. In many instances, the amount of the debt was so 
high and the earnings of sureties so low that the sureties themselves 
became bankrupt. In these situations, the German Federal Court of Justice 
did not accept the assertion that such a suretyship contract was invalid, as 
contrary to public policy (Article 138 subpara. 1 of the German Civil Code). 
43) Jauernig/Mansel, Kommentar zum BGB, 16. Auflage 2015, § 242 Rdnr. 9 
(Ermächtigunsfunktion).
44) For example, Münchener Kommentar zum BGB/Schubert, 7. Auflage 2016, § 242 
Rdnr. 57 ff.
45) Detailed description of this case in English can be found in Michael L. Hughes, Private 
Equity, Social Inequity: German Judges React to Inflation, 1914-24, Central European History, Vol. 
16, No. 1, 1983, pp. 76 ff. See, Grimm, NJW 1997, 2719, 2724 f., too.
46) RGZ, 107, 78-94. In this case, the debt was arose in 1913, and the due date was in 1920. 
According to the court, the cost of living index had between 1913 and 1920 increased tenfold.
47) See Hughes supra note 45.
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However, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that civil courts 
are bound to control the content of contracts that are unusually 
burdensome for one of the two parties and which result from structurally 
unequal bargaining power.48) Although this decision was highly 
controversial,49) the Federal Court of Justice accepted it.50) Strictly speaking, 
this was not a case of conflict between the legislature and the judiciary, but 
between the Federal Constitutional Court and ordinary courts. However, it 
is still a good example of judicial activism in interpretation.
IV. Factors Relevant to Judicial Activism
I posit that courts should take the following four factors into 
consideration when making activist decisions, and they generally do so in 
practice: (1) statutory texts, (2) compatibility with the existing legal system, 
(3) the comparative advantage between the legislature and the judiciary, 
and (4) the magnitude of the impact upon legal relations.
1. The Statutory Texts
In cases where there is a statute, interpretation should always begin 
from the text of the relevant statute. Extensive interpretation is a preferred 
tool of the activist court. Constitution-compatible interpretation is a good 
example. Even when the statute seems to state something other than the 
result the court wants to achieve, that is not always an insurmountable 
hurdle for an activist court. The court may use teleological reduction, 
analogy, or teleological extension to circumvent the statute.
In extraordinary situations, courts decide against the clear text of 
statutes (contra legem). An example from Korean law is the precedent on 
the statement of the place of issue in a bill of exchange or promissory note. 
The Korean Bills of Exchange and Promissory Note Act, which is an literal 
translation of the Geneva Convention Providing a Uniform Law For Bills of 
48) Decision on November 19, 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214 ff.
49) For example, Zöllner, Regelungsspielräume im Schuldvertragsrecht, AcP 196 (1996), 1 ff.
50) See, Philip Ungan, Sicherheiten durch Angehörige, 2013.
180 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 16: 163
Exchange and Promissory Notes (1930), provides that a bill of exchange 
should contain a statement of the place where the bill is issued and that any 
bill issued without such a statement is invalid. However, the majority 
opinion of the Korean Supreme Court on April 23, 199851) held that a 
domestic promissory note, issued and payable in Korea, remained valid 
even though it did not contain a statement of the place where the bill was 
issued. The supplementing opinion to the majority opinion insisted that it is 
the mission of the judiciary to interpret statutes reasonably so as to adapt 
an archaic law to the progress of social phenomena and that it is improper 
for courts to be bound to follow the law as written until it is revised by the 
legislature when the courts know that the conventional interpretation and 
application of the outmoded law would bring about inequitable results.
However, the legitimacy of these interpretations is highly questionable. 
It is apparent that the majority opinion is based upon the maxim “cessate 
ratione legis, cessat lex ipsa” (“the law itself ceases, if the reason of the law 
ceases”). Such a maxim should not be accepted in principle, as the judiciary 
has no authority to change laws purely on the strength of its own 
findings.52) Only when textual interpretation leads to an evidently absurd 
result may a court make a correction of a statute.53) The issue involving the 
lack of a statement of the place of issuance of a bill of exchange is hardly 
such an example.
If there is no relevant statute, as is the case with regard to the contingent 
fee issue, then the text of statute cannot be a factor to consider.
51) Supreme Court, 95Da36466, (Gong98.5.15.[58], 1338), Apr. 23, 1998,.
52) Ernst A. Kramer, Juristische Methodenlehre, 2. ed., 2005, p. 200. However, Larenz and 
Canaris seems of somewhat different opinion. Mehtodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 3. ed., 
1995, p. 171.
53) See Kramer supra note 52, p. 201 ff.; Stefan Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in 
England und auf demKontinent, Bd. 2, 2001, p. 1267. About the absurd result rule in the US, see, 
for example, William Eskridge, Jr. et al., Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed., 2006, 
pp. 207 ff.; Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 25 ff. (2006).
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2. Compatibility with the Existing Legal System
It is evident that the results of activist interpretation cannot be accepted, 
if such results are not compatible with or even contradict the existing legal 
system. The following two Korean cases exemplify this phenomenon.
The first is the precedent regarding the so-called conscientious objector 
problem. Korean law does not provide an exemption from mandatory 
military service for conscientious objectors. However, it prescribes that one 
who does not muster shall not be punished when he has a just cause. 
Therefore, there is a dispute as to whether one who has refused military 
service on conscientious grounds may be regarded as having a just cause. 
The majority opinion of the en banc decision of the Supreme Court on July 
15, 2004 answered this question in the negative.54) It opined further that the 
legislature’s failure to provide an exemption from military service for 
conscientious objectors without providing them alternative civilian service 
is not unconstitutional.
In my opinion, it is difficult to acknowledge the refusal of military 
service for reasons of conscience as having a just cause. If conscientious 
objectors are exempted from military service, they should be assigned to 
alternative civilian service, as occurs in other countries that do permit the 
refusal of military service for reasons of conscience. In other words, a 
precondition of exemption from military service should be the possibility of 
alternative civilian service. As long as no such option exists, it is impossible 
to regard conscientious objectors as having a just cause on the level of 
interpretation. However, from the perspective of human rights, this 
situation is much more problematic. To require military service for 
conscientious objectors without providing alternative civilian service 
should be regarded as a violation of the human right of conscience. 
Regrettably, the decision of the Korean Constitutional Court on August 26, 
200455) declared that this was not unconstitutional. However, the Court 
recommended that the legislature consider the introduction of alternative 
54) Supreme Court, 2004Do2965, (Gong2004.8.15.[208], 1396), Jul. 15, 2004.
55) Constitutional Court, 2002Heonga1, (HeonGongJe96Ho), Aug. 26, 2004, Honpop 
chaepanso Pallyejip Vol. 16-2.
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civilian service or other measures to protect the human rights of 
conscientious objectors.56) The Constitutional Court has maintained this 
position through the present day.57) I believe that the Constitutional Court 
should have decided that the relevant law was not merely unconstitutional 
but actually incompatible with the Constitution, as long as there was no 
possibility of alternative civilian service.
The second example is the recent first instance decision regarding same-
sex marriage. On May 25, 2016, the Seoul Western District Court 
determined that same-sex couples could not marry each other.58) In this 
case, the judge Taejong Lee, President of the Court, declared that marriage 
should be entered into by a man and a woman, not between a man and a 
man, as, in this case, or a woman and a woman. In addition to citing the 
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, which 
understood marriage as the union of a man and a woman, he stressed that 
Article 36 subpara. 1 of the Constitution prescribes that marriage and 
family life shall be entered into and sustained on the basis of the dignity of 
the individual and the equality of both sexes. Furthermore, even though the 
Civil Code does not expressly define marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman, the Code denotes the partners in a marriage as husband and wife. 
In light of these facts, Judge Lee concluded that marriage as prescribed in 
current law cannot be interpreted more widely, i.e. as a union of two 
persons irrespective of sex. 
3. The Comparative Advantage Between the Legislature and the Court
The support for judicial activism becomes fragile if the legislature is in a 
better position to resolve a problem. By contrast, if the legislature has no 
comparative advantage, or is not willing to act, judicial activism can be 
much more easily justified. 
56) The dissenting opinion asserted that not providing the alternative civilian service was 
unconstitutional. 
57) Case 2007Heonga12, (HeonGongJe179Ho)(Honpop chaepanso, Aug. 30, 2011) et al., 
Honpop chaepanso Pallyejip Vol. 23-2, 132; Case 2008Heonga22, (HeonGongJe179Ho)
(Honpop chaepanso, Aug. 30, 2011) et al., Honpop chaepanso Pallyejip Vol. 23-2, 174.
58) Seoul Western District Court, 2014Hopa1842, May 25, 2016 (not yet officially 
published).
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The legislature has a comparative advantage over courts when special 
information or knowledge that the court cannot easily obtain is needed to 
resolve a problem. In these cases, the legislature can obtain the necessary 
information or knowledge from specialists or other relevant actors in a 
variety of ways. When this is the situation, the role of the courts should be 
limited. The Korean Constitutional Court once declared that a finding of 
the reasonableness and appropriateness of the fiscal expenditure requires 
expertise in the fiscal area, and that any review by the courts may thus be 
difficult.59)
In other cases when comprehensive and overall reforms or detailed 
regulations are necessary, courts should refrain from active intervention. 
For example, the decision of the Seoul Western District Court on same-sex 
marriage60) held that the problems that could be expected to arise in the 
event of the protection of same-sex marriages would necessitate regulations 
in various legal areas, and that these problems could not be resolved within 
the scope of courts’ interpretation of the law. Rather, they should be treated 
in a novel manner by new acts of legislation. 
If it is likely that the legislature will react in a timely fashion to a certain 
problem, it is reasonable for the court to await the decision of the 
legislature. For example, in Bellinger v. Bellinger, the UK House of Lords 
declined to interpret “female” as including a transsexual female, declaring 
instead that the relevant statute was incompatible with the European 
Convention of Human Rights.61) One plausible explanation is that, at the 
time the decision was delivered, Parliament was about to consider the 
Gender Recognition Bill,62) which aimed to put into place an entirely new 
scheme for the registration of newly acquired genders.63)
Another example is the en banc decision of the Korean Supreme Court 
59) Constitutional Court 2005Heonma598, (HeonGongJe114Ho), Mar. 30, 2006, Honpop 
chaepanso Pallyejip Vol. 18-1, no. 1, 298.
60) See supra note 58.
61) See supra note 28.
62) The Bill eventually became Gender Recognition Act 2004.
63) See Tom R. Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and The Human 
Rights Act 1998, Public Law 2005, 332; Jinsu Yune supra note 28, p. 420; Günter Hager supra 
note 28, pp. 27 ff.
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regarding an occupational accident on September 28, 2007.64) In this case, 
the majority opinion declined to overrule previous precedents that 
accidents arising in the course of commuting were not occupational 
accidents in the context of public occupational accident insurance.65) The 
supplementing opinion of three justices to the majority opinion cited, 
alongside other grounds, that this matter had been discussed in depth by a 
committee of the government and that a bill reflecting that discussion was 
pending in the Assembly, so the court should refrain from intervening.
On the other hand, if it does not appear plausible that the legislature 
will act in the near future, that can provide an opportunity for a court to be 
more activist. The Korean precedent on transsexuals, referred to above, is a 
good example here.66) At the time of the decision in 2006, there was no sign 
of legislative action. On the contrary, a bill that had been planned to permit 
a change of sex for transsexuals had been introduced in the Korean 
Assembly in November 2002. However, without serious discussion, it 
expired in 2004when the terms of the incumbent members ended.67) 
Moreover, during the 10 years since the decision in 2006, no relevant law 
has been passed. Therefore, the intervention of the Korean Supreme Court 
seems all the more justified.68)
4. The Magnitude of the Impact Upon Legal Relations
Finally, the magnitude of the impact of a decision should be a major 
concern for courts. In general, the result of an activist judgment is likely to 
set up a new rule that overturns a previous rule. The new rule may require 
changes in people’s behavior. Alternatively, it may create a great burden on 
a certain class of people, or increase an existing burden. As precedents of 
courts should be retroactive in principle, the disturbance they cause can be 
great. This can make the court reluctant to adopt an activist stance.
64) Supreme Court, 2005Du12572 (Gong2007.10.15.(284), 1685), Sept. 28, 2007.
65) In case of public officials, accidents arising in the course of commute were already 
treated as occupational accidents.
66) See supra note 32.
67) See Jinsu Yune supra note 28, p. 410.
68) See Jinsu Yune supra note 28, pp.419 ff.
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The Korean precedent on the occupational accident, mentioned above,69) 
can serve as a good example in this context. The supplementing opinion of 
three justices to the majority opinion asserted that to include accidents 
during commuting in the category of occupational accidents would cause 
an enormous burden on the finances of the public occupational accident 
insurance scheme and cause a deterioration in its effectiveness, increase the 
burden on employers, and hinder the efficient distribution of the national 
budget, among other consequences. Therefore, the supplementing opinion 
concluded that this matter should be decided upon by the legislature, not 
by the court.
5. Application to This Case
Thus, may the Supreme Court decision on the contingent fee agreement 
be justified in terms of judicial activism? I believe that it can be.
To begin with, there was no statutory law regulating contingent fees for 
lawyers. Therefore, there was no textual hurdle for the court; nor is there an 
incompatibility problem with the existing legal system.
Secondly, whether the legislature can handle the matter better than the 
court, as some Korean scholars maintain, is worth considering carefully. If 
the legislature intervenes, it could create a detailed rule. For example, it 
could prescribe the exact conditions under which lawyers can agree to 
receive a contingent fee in criminal cases. Alternatively, it could establish a 
cap on contingent fees in criminal cases. It should be acknowledged that 
such a regulatory system might be a better alternative than complete 
nullification of contingent fee agreements in criminal cases.
However, it was unlikely, at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, 
that the Korean Assembly would make a law regulating contingent fee 
agreements. In fact, there had previously been debates about legislation 
that would regulate such fees. In 2000, The Judiciary Reform Committee, an 
advisory committee to the President, recommended that contingent fee 
agreements in criminal cases should be prohibited, even while they are 
allowed in other areas. Furthermore, bills prohibiting the contingent fee 
69) See supra note 64.
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agreement were introduced in the Korean Assembly twice, in 2006 and 
2008. However, these bills expired in 2008 and 2012, respectively, when 
terms of Assembly members ended. One reason for the failure of the bills 
was the opposition of the KBA. The press release cited above70) emphasized 
these facts. From all of the above, it can be safely assumed that the justices 
of the Supreme Court believed that a change in the law by the Assembly 
was not to be expected at the time of the court decision. 
Finally, it is evident that the impact of the decision upon contingent fee 
agreements entered into before the decision was a major concern to the 
justices of the Supreme Court. In particular, should contingent fees already 
paid at the time of the decision be returned? The Supreme Court was 
concerned that declaring contingent fee agreements entered into before the 
decision as void might bring about inequitable results, depending on 
whether the agreed contingent monies could or could not be agreed to on a 
non-contingent basis. It seemed to the justices that it would not be fair if 
fees already agreed to could not be requested or money already paid must 
be returned. At that point, the Supreme Court adopted the tour de force of 
purely prospective overruling. According to the Supreme Court, the 
overruling of the former decision should only be prospective. That is, only 
contingent fee agreements entered into after this decision are void, while 
any such agreements before the decision should be deemed still 
enforceable. The Supreme Court wanted to make it clear that, while 
contingent fee agreements should not be allowed in the future, at the same 
time the impact upon the existing agreements of this type should be 
minimized. This was an effort to kill two birds with one stone.
Can this maneuver of prospective overruling be justified? In what 
follows, I consider this matter in more detail.
70) See supra note 9.
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V. The Problem of Prospective Overruling
1. Prospective Overruling
It was conventional wisdom that “[J]udicial decisions have had 
retrospective operation for nearly a thousand years.”71) Recently, however, 
prospective overruling has been recognized in several jurisdictions.72) There 
are two types of prospective overruling: selective prospective overruling 
and pure selective overruling. Selective prospective overruling means that 
the new rule applies to the case announcing the new rule and, possibly, to 
some other limited cases, but is not applied retroactively to other cases 
predating the new decision. Any overruled precedent still governs old 
cases. By contrast, pure prospective overruling denies any retroactivity of 
the new rule, even to the case announcing the new rule.
The merit of prospective overruling is that it can protect legitimate 
expectations in regard to overruled precedents. The retroactive application 
of overruling decisions to cases prior to these decisions may infringe on the 
legitimate expectations of the people who have acted in reliance on old 
precedents. The retroactive application of a new law has the same problem. 
One difference is that the classic understanding of the role of courts is that 
judges interpret, rather than make, the law.
The US experience in this regard is well understood.73) Since Great 
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.,74) the United States 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that prospective overruling might be 
71) Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co. 215 US 349, 372(1910) (Holmes, dissenting).
72) For comparative researches, Eva Steiner ed., Comparing the Prospective Effect of Judicial 
Rulings Across Jurisdictions (2015); articles by Jürgen Basedow, Hannes Rösler, Helge Dedek, 
Felix Maultzsch, Susan Emmenegger and Bertrand Fages in Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 79, pp. 237 
ff. (2015). For a short description, see Günther Hager, Rechtsmethoden in Europa, pp. 213 ff. 
(2009).
73) See, Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, in Eva 
Steiner ed., supra note 72, pp. 209 ff.; Hannes Rösler, Die Rechtsprechungsänderung im 
US-amerikanischen Privatrecht, Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 79, pp. 250 ff. I have written on the 
subject, too. Jinsu Yune, Migukbeobsang Panryeeui Sogeubhyo (The Retroactivity of Precedents in 
American Law), Justice Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 91-121 (1995).
74) 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed.360 (1932).
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permissible in certain special cases. In the 1960s, prospective overruling 
was used more frequently. The leading cases are Linkletter v. Walker75) 
among criminal cases and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson76) among civil cases. 
However, beginning in the 1980s, these precedents of prospective 
overruling were again overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky77) for criminal 
cases and Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation78) for civil cases. It 
must be noted, however, that whether pure prospective overruling, apart 
from selective overruling, should not be allowed remains unclear. 
Furthermore, state courts may limit the retroactive operation of their own 
interpretations of state laws.79)
In the UK, five out of seven Law Lords of the House of Lords in 
National Westminster Bank v. Spectrum Plus Ltd.80) agreed that the 
possibility of prospective overruling cannot be entirely excluded, although 
prospective overruling in that particular case was denied.81) Lord Nicholls 
of Birkenhead said that he would not regard prospective overruling as 
trespassing beyond the functions properly discharged by the judiciary 
under the constitution.82)
In Germany, there are also instances when courts declared overruling to 
be prospective.83) One recent example is the decision of the grand panel of 
the Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof) on December 17, 2007.84) In that 
decision, the Court held that the overruling of precedents in that case, 
which would be less favorable to taxpayers, should be applied only to the 
cases that occurred after the day of the decision’s publication. It reasoned 
that the principle of material justice had equal value with the principle of 
75) 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965).
76) 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1972).
77) 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
78) 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
79) Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 100 (1993).
80) [2005] UKHL 41.
81) See, Helge Dedek, Rumblings from Olympus: Das Zeitelement in der (Fort-)Bildung des 
englischen common law, Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 79, pp. 313 ff. 
82) According to Lord Nicholls, ‘Never say never’ is a wise judicial precept.
83) Felix Maultzsch, Das Zeitelement in der richterlichen Fortbildung des deutschen 
Rechts, Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 79, pp. 323 ff.
84) BeckRS 2007, 24003227.
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legal certainty and the protection of legitimate reliance and that these two 
subprinciples of the rule of law principle (Rechtsstaatsgebot) should be 
balanced in accordance with the principle of practical concordance 
(praktische Konkordanz). It asserted that the principle of retroactive law may 
be applied to the overruling of precedents by analogy and, in this case, the 
grand panel of the Federal Fiscal Court de facto acted as a maker of rules.
In Korea, there were two precedents of selective prospective overruling 
prior to this decision.85)
One was the precedent regarding membership in the Jongjung. A 
Jongjung is an organized group of descendants of a common male ancestor. 
According to customary law, only adult male descendants of a common 
ancestor could be members of a Jongjung. Female descendants were 
excluded from a Jongjung. However, on July 21, 2005,86) the en banc decision 
of the Supreme Court declared that the customary law that had excluded 
females from Jongjung was no longer valid and that females could also be 
members of a Jongjung.  Moreover, this decision declared that the new rule 
should have only a prospective effect, as its retroactive application would 
disturb numerous legal relationships that had been formed in reliance on 
age-old precedents. The new rule was retroactively applied only to the 
present case. The other case involved determining the host or hostess of 
ancestor worship ritual(Jesa). According to Article 1008-3 of the Korean 
Civil Code, the property for ancestor worship ritual belongs to the host or 
hostess of a particular ancestor worship ritual. Traditionally, the eldest 
legitimate son of the ancestor served as the host of the ritual, and Supreme 
Court precedent had confirmed this custom several times. However, the en 
banc decision of the Supreme Court declared, on November 20, 2008,87) that 
the customary rule of choosing the host or hostess of the ancestor worship 
ritual was no longer valid. It held that the host or hostess must be decided 
by agreement among heirs. If no such agreement could be reached, the 
eldest son (in the case of his being deceased, his eldest son) or, in the case 
when no son was present, the eldest daughter should be the host or hostess. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court again adopted the method of selective 
85) About these decisions, See Jinsu Yune supra note 34.
86) Supreme Court, 2002Da1178, (Gong2005.8.15.(232), 1326), Jul. 21, 2005. 
87) Supreme Court 2007Da27670, (Gong2008Ha, 1727), Nov. 20, 2008.
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prospective overruling. If this new rule were to be applied retroactively, 
numerous previous instances of the succession of the property for ancestor 
worship ritual would be affected and both legal certainty and the 
protection of the reliance based on the principle of good faith would be 
endangered. Therefore, the new rule should be applied only to the 
succession of the property after this decision. However, this new rule 
should be applied to the present case, too, as the aim of the declaring the 
new rule in this case was to use it as the legal basis for this very decision. 
The decision on the contingent fee agreement differs from previous Korean 
precedents, as this decision adopted pure prospective overruling, not 
selective prospective overruling.
2. Criticism
In my opinion, the theory of prospective overruling cannot be 
sustained. I could not find any principled argument in support of the 
theory advanced, except for the necessity to protect reliance on the previous 
overruled precedents. Prospective overruling is not compatible with the 
function of courts. Courts should decide about the actual cases before them, 
not about possible future cases. The task of courts is to do justice to each 
litigant on the merits of his or her own case.88) That is, they should 
decide cases based upon the court’s best current understanding of the 
law.89) Selective overruling enables the parties of overruling cases to obtain 
the benefits of overruling, and thus does not remove the incentive of the 
party to assert overruling. However, this is not possible, even for the 
legislature. Therefore, prospective overruling makes courts a sort of super-
legislature.90) The protection of legitimate reliance is also an important 
interest. However, that protection can and should be assured through the 
rules of the substantive law, not by choosing a legal rule.91) For example, the 
88) Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, dissenting).
89) James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991).
90) Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 274 (2008) {Stevens, citing Justice Harlan in Desist 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969)}.
91) American Trucking Associations, Inc., v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 210 (1990) (Stevens, 
dissenting).
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principle of good faith, abuse of right, laches (Verwirkung) can be used to 
protect legitimate reliance. In the contingent fee agreement case, what the 
Supreme Court was most concerned about was that the agreed contingent 
fee could not be agreed on a non-contingent basis at the same amount, if the 
prior contingent fee agreement were to be regarded as void altogether. 
However, this result could be avoided by the theory of supplementary 
interpretation (ergänzende Auslegung). According to this theory, if there is a 
gap in the contract upon which the parties had not reckoned, courts can fill 
in the gap by what the parties would have agreed upon had they known of 
the gap. The Korean Supreme Court has acknowledged and applied the 
theory of supplementary interpretation.92) If supplementary interpretation 
were applied to the invalid contingency fee agreement, an attorney could 
request the sum to which the parties would have agreed on a non-
contingent basis, had they known the invalidity of the contingency fee 
agreement. If the client had already paid the contingent fee to the lawyer, 
the client could not request the return of the payment, as the payment 
would be for an illegal purpose.93) If the Korean Supreme Court had chosen 
this path in this case, prospective overruling would be unnecessary. 
VI. Conclusion
Whether contingent fee agreements in criminal cases should be 
regarded as contrary to public policy is an important question in itself. 
As this question was answered by the court and not by the legislature, it 
inevitably leads us to the issue of judicial activism. The theory of 
prospective overruling was a related problem. This decision provided a 
good opportunity for a case study of judicial activism and prospective 
overruling.
92) Supreme Court, 2005Da13288, (Gong2007.1.1.(265), 24), Nov. 23, 2006; Supreme Court, 
2009Da91811, (Gong2014Ha, 2305), Nov. 13, 2014.
93) MINBUP [The Korean Civ. Code] art. 746 (S. KOR.) (excluding return of Enrichment 
arising from a transfer made for an illegal or immoral purpose, condictio ob turpem veliniustam 
causam). This article corresponds to article 817 of the German Civil Code roughly.

